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State v. Frederick, 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 27 (April 25, 2013)1 
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Summary 
This is an appeal from a district court order granting respondent’s post-conviction motion 
to withdraw his guilty plea.  The appeal invokes the question of whether justices of the peace 
may take felony pleas while serving as district court masters. 
Disposition/Outcome 
The Court reversed the district court order, concluding that justices of the peace may hear 
felony pleas if acting in a separate capacity as an appointed district court master.  Although 
justices of the peace do not have jurisdiction to accept felony pleas, a justice of the peace 
properly appointed by the district court to serve as a district court master may hear felony pleas.  
The Nevada Constitution vests authority in the Legislature to determine the jurisdiction 
of the various courts.  The Court determined that the statute authorizing the district courts to 
delegate its ministerial power to the justice court, NRS 3.245, does not violate the separation of 
powers provision.  Furthermore, the Eighth Judicial District Court Rule (EDCR) 1.48, which 
defines the scope of delegation, falls within the Legislature’s grant of authority under NRS 
3.245.  In permitting justices of the peace to serve as district court masters and, in that capacity, 
hear felony pleas, the Court distinguished this case from its recent opinion in Hernandez v. 
Bennett-Haron.2  
Factual and Procedural History 
Jermaine Frederick entered into a plea agreement with the State after being charged with 
both misdemeanor and felony crimes. Frederick agreed to plead guilty to one misdemeanor and 
one felony charge. Frederick appeared in justice court before Justice of the Peace Melissa 
Saragosa, acting in her dual capacity as an appointed district court master.  Judge Saragosa heard 
the plea of guilty on the misdemeanor and sentenced him on that charge.  Immediately thereafter, 
Judge Saragosa conducted a plea colloquy on the felony charge, determined that Frederick’s plea 
was voluntary, and accepted his plea to the felony charge.  Frederick then proceeded to the 
district court where the district court judge sentenced him to 18-72 months in prison. 
Frederick later filed a motion to withdraw his felony plea, asserting that a Justice of the 
Peace Saragosa did not have jurisdiction to accept the plea. The district court judge granted the 
motion and the State appealed. 
Discussion 
NRS 3.245 does not violate the separation of powers provision of the Nevada Constitution 
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 The Court first addressed the issue of whether NRS 3.245 violates the separation of 
powers provision because it permits the Court, rather than the Legislature, to define the scope of 
judicial power.   
The Nevada Constitution vests original jurisdiction in the district courts to hear and 
decide cases involving felony and gross misdemeanor charges. The justice courts do not have 
jurisdiction in such cases, and NRS 171.196(1) states that “[i]f an offense is not triable in the 
justice court, the defendant must not be called upon to plead.” However, NRS 3.245 permits the 
district court to delegate subordinate and administrative duties to “masters.”  The Legislature 
permits such delegation in order to alleviate the workload of district court judges.  The statute 
also authorizes the Supreme Court to approve the duties the masters may perform. 
Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution prohibits the Legislature from delegating 
certain functions to other branches of government.3  However, the Legislature may delegate to 
other bodies, the power to make rules and regulations supplementing legislation as long as “the 
power given is prescribed in terms sufficiently definite to service as a guide in exercising that 
power.”4 In the judicial context, such a delegation can include administrative or ministerial 
powers so long as those powers are “reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties.”5 
The Court concluded that “allowing the judiciary to determine the subordinate or 
administrative duties that may be assigned to masters is a ministerial function that can be traced 
back to or derived from the basic judicial power and functions (e.g. it relates to how the business 
of the district courts and their judicial functions are handled).”  Thus the Court concluded that 
NRS 3.245 does not violate the separation of power provision. 
EDCR 1.48 falls within the Legislature’s grant of authority under NRS 3.245 
 Given that NRS 3.245 properly permits the courts to delegate certain duties to masters, 
the Court addressed whether EDCR 1.48, the rule that defines the scope of delegation, operates 
within the authority granted by NRS 3.245. 
 EDCR 1.48 defines who may be a district court master and the scope of the delegated 
duties. The Rule provides that an individual appointed as a master in the criminal division must 
be a justice of the peace, a senior justice of the peace, a senior judge or justice, or a member of 
the State bar of Nevada that meets certain qualifications. The Rule further states that permissible 
duties include “accepting pleas of guilty, nolo contender, and not guilty, including ascertaining 
whether the defendant will invoke or waive speedy trial rights.”6 
 The court first addressed the apparent conflict between EDCR 1.48 and the prohibition on 
justices of the peace from hearing felony and gross misdemeanor cases. The Court acknowledged 
that justices of the peace are specifically prohibited from hearing cases involving felonies and 
gross misdemeanors.  However, the Court stated, “[t]he fact that justices of the peace might also 
serve as district court master is only incidental to their roles as justices of the pace and is not an 
unconstitutional judicial expansion of the court’s jurisdiction.” It is not by virtue of their 
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positions as justices of the peace that justices are permitted to act at district court masters, but 
rather, it is their judicial experience.   The Court distinguished EDCR 1.48 from the Clark 
County ordinance at issue in Hernandez.  The county ordinance specifically states that additional 
powers may be delegated to justices of the peace “by virtue of their positions as justices of the 
peace.”7 
 Finally, the Court determined that EDCR operates within the authority granted by NRS 
3.245.  The Legislature granted the Court broad authority to set forth rules.  The court had held a 
public hearing on EDCR 1.48 and subsequently approved the rule.  
Conclusion 
Justice Parraguirre concluded: “Because Frederick’s guilty plea was accepted by a lawfully 
appointed district court master in accordance with EDCR 1.48, we reverse the district court’s 
order granting Frederick’s motion to withdraw his felony plea.” 
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